μια απόπειρα επιστημονικής προσέγγισης της ανθρώπινης θρησκευτικότητας
an attempt for a scientific approach of human religiosity "Sedulo curavi humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere" —Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus 1:4
⏳ ⌛ First post: October 30, 2008 / Πρώτη ανάρτηση: 30 Οκτωβρίου 2008
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Monday, July 29, 2013
Socrates: A victim of an ancient Greek law against proselytism /
Σωκράτης: Θύμα ενός αρχαιοελληνικού νόμου κατά του προσηλυτισμού
1.1.1 I have often wondered by what arguments those who drew up the indictment against Socrates could persuade the Athenians that his life was forfeit to the state. The indictment against him was to this effect: Socrates
is guilty of rejecting the gods acknowledged by the state and of
bringing in strange deities: he is also guilty of corrupting the youth.
1.1.2 First
then, that he rejected the gods acknowledged by the state — what
evidence did they produce of that? He offered sacrifices constantly, and
made no secret of it, now in his home, now at the altars of the state
temples, and he made use of divination with as little secrecy. Indeed it
had become notorious that Socrates claimed to be guided by ‘the deity:’ it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in strange deities arose.
1.1.3 He
was no more bringing in anything strange than are other believers in
divination, who rely on augury, oracles, coincidences and sacrifices.
For these men's belief is not that the birds or the folk met by accident
know what profits the inquirer, but that they are the instruments by
which the gods make this known; and that was Socrates' belief too.
1.1.4 Only, whereas most men say that the birds or the folk they meet dissuade or encourage them, Socrates
said what he meant: for he said that the deity gave him a sign. Many of
his companions were counselled by him to do this or not to do that in
accordance with the warnings of the deity: and those who followed his
advice prospered, and those who rejected it had cause for regret.
1.1.5 And
yet who would not admit that he wished to appear neither a knave nor a
fool to his companions? but he would have been thought both, had he
proved to be mistaken when he alleged that his counsel was in accordance
with divine revelation. Obviously, then, he would not have given the
counsel if he had not been confident that what he said would come true.
And who could have inspired him with that confidence but a god? And
since he had confidence in the gods, how can he have disbelieved in the
existence of the gods?
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