Servetus writeson John 20:28 / Ο Σερβέτος γράφειπερί του Ιωάννης 20:28

 

* Michael Servetus (Michel de Villeneuve),
De Trinitatis erroribus [On the Errors of the Trinity] /

Μιχαήλ Σερβέτος,
Περί των Πλανών της Τριάδας

(1531)  p./σ. 603.

See here for English translation / Βλέπε εδώ για αγγλική μετάφραση

Η γκετοποίηση των αλλόθρησκων & αλλόδοξων στο Βυζάντιο του 13ου αιώνα /Ghettoizing non-Christian communities at 13th cent. Byzantium

*

* Ερωτήσεις του αγιωτάτου
μητροπολίτου Δυρραχίου Κωνσταντίνου του Καβάσιλα,
και αποκρίσεις προς ταύτας του αγιωτάτου
αρχιεπισκόπου πάσης Βουλγαρίας, κυρού Δημητρίου του Χωματιανού,
«Εί έξεστι τοις Αρμενίοις, εν αις πόλεσιν οικούσιν, κατά πάσαν άδειαν κτίζειν εκκλησίας,
και εί τε χρη κωλύεσθαι, ή εάν αυτούς ποιείν, ως βούλονται»,

στο Pitra, Analecta sacra (1891) τόμ. 7  στ. 662-664. 

 

* Ιωάννου του επισκόπου Κίτρου,
αποκρίσεις προς Κωνσταντίνον αρχιεπίσκοπον Δυρραχίου τον Καβάσιλαν,

«Εί έξεστι τοις Αρμενίοις, εν αις πόλεσιν οικούσι, κατά πάσαν άδειαν κτίζειν Εκκλησίας,

και είτε χρη κωλύεσθαι, ή εάν αυτούς ποιείν, ως βούλονται»,

στο Ράλλη & Ποτλή, Σύνταγμα των θείων και ιερών κανόνων (1855) τόμ. 5 σ. 415.

Βλέπε επίσης:

* Ιωάννη Ρωμανού, «Η εβραϊκή κοινότης της Κέρκυρας»
- Εστία 1891, τόμ. 31 τεύχ. 24, σσ. 369-374.
- Εστία 1891, τόμ. 31 τεύχ. 25, σσ. 385-388.
- Εστία 1891, τόμ. 31 τεύχ. 26, σσ. 401-403.
[Ελληνικά/Greek, PDF]

ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ ΡΩΜΑΝΟΣ. Ο Ρωμανός διακριθείς εν τω κύκλω των λογίων ήδη προ της ενώσεως της Επτανήσου συνέγραψε πολλάς ιστορικάς πραγματείας ιδία εφαπτομένας της μεσαιωνικής ημών ιστορίας, ων εξέχει η μονογραφία περί του Γρατιανού Τζώρτζη αυθέντου της Λευκάδος. Εις δε τους αναγνώστας της Εστίας είνε γνωστός εκ της περί Ισαρηλιτικής κοινότητος εν Κερκύρα περισπουδάστου μελέτης του. Καίτοι πολλάκις επροτάθη εις αυτόν η θέσις καθηγητού της ιστορίας εν τω Εθνικώ Πανεπιστημίω, μετριοφρόνως απέσχε πάντοτε ταύτης και ηρκέσθη εις τον απλούν τίτλον γυμνασιάρχου του εν Κερκύρα γυμνασίου. Ο Ρωμανός εχρημάτισε και καθηγητής εις την νεοελληνικής της αυτοκρατείρας της Αυστρίας, πολύ δεν συνετέλεσε δια της μειλιχίου κα ιτερπνής αυτού διδασκαλίας εις την εν Κερκύρα αποκατάστασιν αυτής.

* Δελτίον της Εστίας, Τόμ. 16, Αρ. 13 (1892), σ. 2.
[Ελληνικά/Greek, PDF]

Papal Bull for harsh "disfellowshipping" of the Jews /Παπική βούλα για τη βάναυση «αποκοπή» των Εβραίων

Since it is absurd and improper that Jews—whose own guilt has consigned them to perpetual servitude—under the pretext that Christian piety receives them and tolerates their presence should be ingrates to Christians, so that they attempt to exchange the servitude they owe to Christians for dominion over them; we – to whose notice it has lately come that these Jews, in our dear city and in some other cites, holdings, and territories of the Holy Roman Church, have erupted into insolence: they presume not only to dwell side by side with Christians and near their churches, with no distinct habit to separate them, but even to erect homes in the more noble sections and streets of the cities, holdings, and territories where they dwell, and to buy and possess fixed property, and to have nurses, housemaids, and other hired Christian servants, and to perpetrate many other things in ignominy and contempt of the Christian name—considering that the Roman Church tolerates the Jews in testimony of the true Christian faith and to end [ad hoc, ut] that they, led by the piety and kindness of the Apostolic See, should at length recognize their errors, and make all haste to arrive at the true light of the Catholic faith, and thereby [propterea] to agree that, as long as they persist in their errors, they should recognize through experience that they have been made slaves while Christians have been made free through Jesus Christ, God and our Lord, and that it is iniquitous that the children of the free woman should serve the children of the maid-servant—

1. Desiring to make sound provisions as best we can, with the help of God, in the above matter, we sanction by this our perpetually valid constitution that, among other things, in all future times in this city, as in all other cities, holdings, and territories belonging to the Roman Church, all Jews should live solely in one and the same location, or if that is not possible, in two or three or as many as are necessary, which are to be contiguous and separated completely from the dwellings of Christians. These places are to be designated by us in our city and by our magistrates in other cities, holdings, and territories. And they should have one entry alone, and so too one exit.

2. And in the individual cities, holdings, and territories where they dwell, they [the Jews] should have one synagogue alone in its customary location, and they may construct no new synagogue. Nor may they possess any real property. Accordingly, they must demolish and destroy all their other synagogues except for this one alone. The real property which they now possess, they must sell to all Christians within a period of time designated by the local magistrates.

3. And so that they be identified everywhere as Jews, men and women respectively required and bound to wear in full view a hat or some obvious marking, both to be blue in color, in such a way that they man not be concealed or hidden. Nor may they be excused from wearing the hat or marking on the pretext of rank, eminence, or privilege; nor may the acquire and absolution or dispensation through the ecclesiastical chamberlain, clerics of the Apostolic Camera and other persons presiding there, or through legates and vice-legates of the Apostolic See.

4. [And they shall not] have nurses or serving women or any other Christians serving them, of whatever sex. Nor shall they have their children wet-nursed or reared by Christian women.

5. Nor may they themselves or anyone in their employ labor in public on Sundays or other feast days declared by the Church.

6. Nor may they oppress Christians in any manner, [especially by] drawing up fictitious or simulated contracts [of debt].

7. Nor should they be so presumptuous as to entertain or dine with Christians or to develop close relations and friendships with them.

8. Nor may they use in the ledgers and account books which they have with Christians, [stipulating] the duration [of loans, etc.] any other alphabet than the Latin one or any other language than everyday Italian. If they do otherwise, these books will have no value [when brought up as testimony in court] against Christians [who have defaulted on repayment].

9. Additionally, these Jews may carry on no business as purveyors of grain, barley, or other items necessary for human sustenance, but must be limited [in this sphere] to dealing only in second-hand clothing, the arte cenciariae (as it is commonly called).

10. As for those among them [the Jews] who are physicians, even if they are summoned and requested, they may not come forth and attend to the care of Christians.

11. Nor may the permit the Christian poor [or any other Christian for that matter] to address them as Master.

12. And in their computation s and accounting, months must be composed of thirty fully completed days, and days that do not add up to the number thirty must be computed not as full months, but only as the actual number of days that have elapsed—and they [the Jews] may demand repayment only according to the number of days, not according to the rate for completed months. Pledges temporarily given them as collateral for their money, they may not sell for eighteen months, unless [otherwise] agreed upon prior to the day on which the pledges were actually given. After eighteen months have passed, if the Jews sell these pledges, all receipts over and above the value of the original loan must be made over to the owner of the pledge [i.e. the original borrower].

13. They will be held to observe without exception all statutes of the cities, holdings, and territories in which they dwell that give advantage to [lit. concern the favor of] Christians [over Jews].

14. And if they transgress the above in any way, either by us, or by our vicar, or by others deputized by us in the city, or by those ritories, they should be punished according to the nature of the transgression, either as rebels or perpetrators of the crime of lese majeste, and as those who have renounced their allegiance to the entire Christian people, in accordance with the determination made by us or the vicars, deputies, and magistrates.

15. Notwithstanding the apostolic constitutions and ordinations and whatever apostolic tolerations, privileges or indults conceded to those Jews through any of our predecessors, the Roman pontiffs, or legates of that See, or chamberlains of this Roman Church, or clerics of the Apostolic Camera or others presiding there, under whatever decree or edict and with whatever limitations—even limitations of limitations, and other more valid and unusual clauses, and equally with other decrees and invalidations, indeed, by our own action and from our clear knowledge and by the plentitude of apostolic power, and even by approbations, and so too by changes which have been renewed and approved repeatedly—with respect to all the foregoing, as well as with respect to anything whatsoever to the contrary [to this letter], even if in place of a general abrogation concerning them and all their stipulations a special, specific, express, and individual mention or whatever other expression has had to be made or some carefully chosen form has had to be retained, for each and every word and not only for the general clauses themselves important, we, in this place, both specifically and expressly, abrogate decrees of this kind, even if word for word, with nothing at all omitted and the traditional form preserved in them they have been inserted [into this present letter], having expressed clearly in this letter that these decrees should otherwise remain in force.

No one [may act against this letter], etc. If anyone [so dares, he will call upon himself Apostolic censure], etc. Given at Rome at St. Mark’s, in the year of the Incarnation of the Lord one thousand five hundred fifty-five, on the day before the ides of July, in the first year of our pontificate.

* Pope Paul IV, Cum nimis absurdum [Εφόσον είναι εξωφρενικό] (1555) [Latin].
[English/Αγγλικά, PDF]    *

from Kenneth Stow,
Catholic Thought and Papal Jewry Policy 1555-1593,
New York, 1977,
pp. 294-298.

Το Όνομα του Ρόδου, του Umberto Eco (1980), σε κινηματογραφική μεταφορά του Jean-Jacques Annaud (1986)

Το Όνομα του Ρόδου (Il Nome della Rosa)

Επιβολή συγκεκριμένων θεολογικών θέσεωνμέσω σύγκλησης γενικών εκκλησιαστικών συνόδων /Enforcing particular theological views by summoning general Councils of the Church

Η γενική μου θέση είναι πως η Σύνοδος της Χαλκηδόνος ήταν εξίσου μηχανισμός καταστολής όσο και η Δεύτερη Έφεσος (η λεγόμενη Ληστρική Σύνοδος), και μάλιστα ότι ο μηχανισμός ήταν πολύ πιο ισχυρός στη Χαλκηδόνα, τόσο που δεν χρειάστηκε να ασκηθεί πραγματική βία ή έστω να υπάρξει εμφανής απειλή βίας, διότι ο καθένας γνώριζε ότι η αντίσταση στην αυτοκρατορική θέληση θα κατέληγε στην καταστροφή του: απώλεια του επισκοπικού αξιώματος, αφορισμό, και ίσως εξορία σε έναν απομακρυσμένο τόπο της αυτοκρατορίας. Αυτό δεν θα έπρεπε να εκπλήσσει κανέναν, διότι αποτελεί  απλώς ένα από τα πολλά παραδείγματα τού άκρως εκτεταμένου ελέγχου που μπορούσε να ασκήσει ένας ρωμαίος αυτοκράτορας (αν το επιθυμούσε) επί των χριστιανικών εκκλησιών, στην περιοχή πού διοικούσε, ακόμη και στη σφαίρα του δόγματος. Εάν ένας αυτοκράτορας επιθυμούσε να επιβάλει ένα συγκεκριμένο σύστημα θεολογικών απόψεων, μπορούσε να το επιτύχει συγκαλώντας μια γενική σύνοδο της Εκκλησίας, πράγμα που μόνο αυτός είχε δικαίωμα να το κάνει. Ακόμη και ο πάπας Λέων ο Μέγας, ο οποίος είχε την πιο μεγάλη ιδέα για τη σημασία της Αποστολικής Έδρας, αναγκάστηκε να παραδεχτεί, στην αλληλογραφία του με τον Θεοδόσιο Β', με την Πουλχερία και τον Μαρκιανό, ότι ο αυτοκράτορας και μόνο αυτός αποφάσιζε εάν, πότε και πού θα συγκαλούσε γενική σύνοδο. Ο Λέων άλλαξε αρκετές φορές γνώμη σχετικά με τη σκοπιμότητα μιας γενικής συνόδου υπό τις συνθήκες του 449-51, χωρίς όμως να μπορέσει να επιβάλει την άποψή του. Στο τέλος αναγκάστηκε να αρκεστεί με την υιοθέτηση από τη Χαλκηδόνα της δογματικής επιστολής του προς τον Φλαβιανό, γνωστής ως «Τόμος του Λέοντα» και ως καλύτερης διακήρυξης Αληθινής Πίστης. Αναθέτοντας τον έλεγχο της συνόδου στα κατάλληλα πρόσωπα, ένας αυτοκράτορας μπορούσε να επιτύχει τις αποφάσεις που ήθελε. Βέβαια, ίσως να μην μπορούσε να επιβάλει κατόπιν τη δική του εκδοχή για το χριστιανισμό σε όλες τις κτήσεις του. Η Σύνοδος της Χαλκηδόνος, η οποία αυτή καθαυτήν μπορεί να φαίνεται ως ένας απόλυτος θρίαμβος και επαινείται αφειδώς από πολλούς σύγχρονους θεολόγους, έχει συχνά περιγραφεί (ορθώς, κατά την άποψή μου) ως καταστροφή για την Ανατολική Αυτοκρατορία. Όπως το έθεσε ο Norman Baynes, η Χαλκηδόνα συγκλήθηκε «όχι για να φέρει την ειρήνη, άλλα το σπαθί». Ο μονοφυσιτισμός ήταν πολύ ισχυρός για να καταπνιγεί σε ορισμένες περιοχές, κυρίως στην Αίγυπτο, καθώς και σε τμήματα της Συρίας και της Μεσοποταμίας· οι ορθόδοξοι αυτοκράτορες όφειλαν ασφαλώς να μείνουν ικανοποιημένοι με δογματικές διατυπώσεις που θα τον είχαν ενσωματώσει, ή τουλάχιστον θα ανέχονταν την ύπαρξή του. Σχεδόν όλοι όμως οι επίσκοποι επιθυμούσαν διακαώς να εξαλείψουν αυτό πού θεωρούσαν αίρεση.

* Geoffrey de Ste Croix,
Ο χριστιανισμός και η Ρώμη. Διωγμοί, αιρέσεις και ήθη,
Μετάφρ. Ιωάννα Κράλλη,
Αθήνα 2005, 1η ανατύπωση 2010,
σσ. 328-330.

My overall thesis is that the Council of Chalcedon was every bit as much an engine of coercion as the ‘Robber’ Council of Second Ephesus, and that the machinery of compulsion was actually far more powerful at Chalcedon, so much so that actual force did not need to be used, or even visibly threatened, because everyone knew that resistance to the imperial will would result in his ruin: the loss of episcopal office, and perhaps excommunication and exile to a distant part of the empire, as happened to the one determined opponent, Dioscorus. This should not surprise anyone, as it only provides one more among many examples of the very high degree of control that a Roman emperor could exercise (if he wished) over the Christian churches in the area over which he ruled, even in the sphere of doctrine. It was easiest to enforce a particular set of theological views by summoning a general Council of the Church, which the emperor alone had the power to do. Even Pope Leo the Great, who had the most exalted idea of the importance of his own Apostolic See, had to admit throughout his correspondence with Theodosius II, Pulcheria, and Marcian, which fortunately survives, that it was the emperor and the emperor alone who decided whether, when, and where to summon a general council. Leo changed his own view about the desirability of a general council more than once between 449 and 451 in the light of changing circumstances, but was unable to impose his wishes. In the end he had to be content with having his doctrinal letter to Flavian of Constantinople, which is commonly referred to as the Tome of Leo, endorsed at Chalcedon as the best statement of the true faith. [...]

It was only by placing control of a council in the right hands that an emperor could be certain of securing the decisions that he wanted: even an emperor’s representative might be outmanoeuvred if he was not presiding. [...]

The Council of Chalcedon, which in isolation can be seen as a complete triumph for Marcian and Two Nature Christology, and which has been lavishly praised by some modern theologians, has often been described, rightly in my opinion, as a disaster for the Eastern Empire: as Norman Baynes put it, Chalcedon came ‘not to bring peace, but a sword’. Monophysite views were far too strong to be suppressed in some areas, above all in Egypt and much of Syria and Mesopotamia, and the Orthodox Empire would surely have done better to be content with doctrinal formulae that would have accommodated it, or at least tolerated its existence. [...]

It is true that most bishops whose voices can be heard wanted to be on record as deeply committed to stamping out what was identified as heresy, but that should come as no surprise.

* Geoffrey de Ste Croix,
edited by Michael Whitby & Joseph Streeter,
Christian Persecution, Martyrdom, and Orthodoxy
[Χριστιανικός Διωγμός, Μαρτύριο και Ορθοδοξία],
pp. 274, 275, 319, 281.

The human being & its society /Το ανθρώπινο ον & η κοινωνία του

I have now reached the point where I may indicate briefly what to me constitutes the essence of the crisis of our time. It concerns the relationship of the individual to society. The individual has become more conscious than ever of his dependence upon society. But he does not experience this dependence as a positive asset, as an organic tie, as a protective force, but rather as a threat to his natural rights, or even to his economic existence. Moreover, his position in society is such that the egotistical drives of his make-up are constantly being accentuated, while his social drives, which are by nature weaker, progressively deteriorate. All human beings, whatever their position in society, are suffering from this process of deterioration. Unknowingly prisoners of their own egotism, they feel insecure, lonely, and deprived of the naive, simple, and unsophisticated enjoyment of life. Man can find meaning in life, short and perilous as it is, only through devoting himself to society.

Έφτασα τώρα στο σημείο στο οποίο μπορώ να καταδείξω εν συντομία τι αποτελεί κατ' εμέ την ουσία της κρίσης της εποχής μας. Αφορά στη σχέση του ατόμου με την κοινωνία. Το άτομο συνειδητοποιεί ολοένα και περισσότερο όσο ποτέ άλλοτε την εξάρτησή του από την κοινωνία. Αλλά δεν βιώνει αυτή την εξάρτηση ως θετικό στοιχείο, ως έναν οργανικό δεσμό, ως μια προστατευτική δύναμη, αλλά μάλλον ως απειλή για τα φυσικά του δικαιώματα, ή ακόμη και για την οικονομική του ύπαρξη. Επιπλέον, η θέση του στην κοινωνία είναι τέτοια ώστε οι εγωιστικές ενορμήσεις της σύστασής του γίνονται συνεχώς εντονότερες, ενώ οι κοινωνικές του ενορμήσεις, οι οποίες είναι εκ φύσεως πιο αδύνατες, σταδιακά φθίνουν. Όλα τα ανθρώπινα όντα, ανεξάρτητα από τη θέση τους στην κοινωνία, υποφέρουν από αυτή τη διαδικασία φθοράς. Εν αγνοία τους δέσμιοι του εγωισμού τους, νιώθουν ανασφαλείς, μόνοι και αποστερημένοι από την αγνή, απλή και ανεπιτήδευτη απόλαυση της ζωής. Ο άνθρωπος μπορεί να βρει νόημα στη ζωή, καθώς αυτή είναι σύντομη και επικίνδυνη, μέσω της αφοσίωσής του στην κοινωνία.

* Albert Einstein,
"Why Socialism?",
["Γιατί Σοσιαλισμός;"],
Monthly Review,
May/Μάιος 1949
(republ. May 1998/
αναδημ. Μάιος 1998).
[English/Αγγλικά, HTML]

Επιφάνιος Σαλαμίνος, Ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Θεοδόσιον τὸν βασιλέα /Epiphanius of Salamis, Epistula ad Theodosium imperatorem

(19.) τὴν εἰδωλολατρείαν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κακοτεχνίᾳ ὁ διάβολος ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἔσπειρε τοῦτο καὶ ἐθεμελίωσε καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπέστρεψε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν μετὰ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τὰ εἴδωλα εἰς ἀρχαίαν εἰδωλολατρείαν τοὺς πιστοὺς καθείλκυσε καὶ ἠπάτησε.

(20.) εἰσφέρει ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ τῇ πίστει τῶν ἐν Νικαίᾳ πατέρων ἐκ νέας ἡλικίας ἠκολουθηκέναι καὶ ὡς οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ ἐν ταύτῃ γεγέννηνται καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶχον ὁμολογίαν.

(21.) νοήσει γὰρ ἡ σὴ εὐσέβεια εἰ πρέπον ἐστὶν ἔχειν ἡμᾶς θεὸν ζωγραφητὸν διὰ χρωμάτων.

(22.) ἤκουσα ὡς καὶ τὸν ἀκατάληπτον υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ τινὲς γράφειν ἐπαγγέλλονται οὐ μέμνημαί τι τοιοῦτον ἰδών.

(23.) τίς τῶν παλαιῶν πατέρων Χριστοῦ εἰκόνα ζωγραφήσας ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν οἴκῳ ἰδίῳ κατέθετο ἢ ἐν βήλοις θυρῶν; <τίς> τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐπισκόπων Χριστὸν ἀτιμάσας ἐζωγράφησεν; τίς τὸν Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, Μω<υ>σέα τε καὶ τοὺς προφήτας ἢ Πέτρον ἢ Ἀνδρέαν ἢ Ἰάκωβον ἢ Ἰωάννην ἢ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀποστόλους οὕτως παρεδειγμάτισεν καὶ ἐθριάμβευσεν;

(24.) ἅμα δὲ καὶ ψεύδονται, ἐξ ἰδίας αὐτῶν ἐννοίας μορφὰς τῶν ἁγίων ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἀνατυποῦντες, ποτὲ μὲν γέροντας ποτὲ δὲ νεωτέρους τοὺς αὐτοὺς, ἃ μὴ ἑωράκασιν ἐμβατεύοντες. κόμην γὰρ ἔχοντατὸν σωτῆρα γράφουσιν ἐξ ὑπονοίας διὰ τὸ Ναζωραῖον αὐτὸν καλεῖσθαι, ἐπείπερ οἱ Ναζιραῖοι κόμας ἔχουσιν. σφάλλονται δὲ οἱ τοὺς τύπους αὐτῷ συνάπτειν πειρώμενοι· οἶνον γὰρ ἔπινεν ὁ σωτήρ, ὃν οἱ Ναζιραῖοι οὐκ ἔπινον.

(25.) οὐ πρέπον ... ἐστὶ θεὸν ἔχειν ἡμᾶς ἐν χρώμασι καὶ μέλεσι ζωγραφούμενον.

(26.) καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ ὅπερ πλάσσουσιν ἀπὸ ἰδίας ἐννοίας διανοούμενοι, ψεύδονται. γράφουσι γὰρ Πέτρον τὸν ἅγιον ἀπόστολον οἱ πλάνοι γέροντα ἄνδρα, τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὸ γένειον κεκαρμένον· γράφουσι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἅγιον Παῦλον ἄλλοι μὲν ἀναφαλαντέα, ἄλλοι δὲ φαλακρὸν γενειήτην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μαθητὰς ψιλῶς κεκαρμένους.

(27.) εἰ τοίνυν κόμην εἶχεν ὁ σωτήρ, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἦσαν κεκαρμένοι καὶ μὴ ἦν αὐτὸς κεκαρμένος καὶ ἴσος αὐτοῖς φαινόμενος, τίνι <τῷ> λόγῳ <οἱ> Φαρισαῖοι καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς τριάκοντα ἀργύρια ἐδίδουν τῷ Ἰούδᾳ μισθοῦ χάριν, ὅπως φιλήσας αὐτὸν ὑποδείξῃ αὐτοῖς ὅτι „οὗτός ἐστιν ὃν ζητεῖτε“, δυνάμενοι καὶ δι’ ἑαυτῶν καὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλων γνῶναι διὰ τοῦ σημείου τῆς κόμης ὃν ἐζήτουν εὑρεῖν καὶ μὴ μισθὸν δοῦναι;

(28.) ὁμολογεῖ, πρῶτα μὲν ὡς χλεύη τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς ληρῳδουμένοις αὐτῷ προὔκειτο, ἔπειτα δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς συνεπισκόποις καὶ συλλειτουργοῖς συμβουλεύσας ταῦτα περιαιρεθῆναι οὐκ ἠκούσθη).  εὕρομεν ἐν τῷ τέλει τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἔμφασιν τοιάδε περιέχουσαν· ὅτι πολλάκις λαλήσας τοῖς συλλειτουργοῖς μου περιαιρεθῆναι τὰς εἰκόνας οὐκ ἐδέχθην παρ’ αὐτῶν οὐδὲ πρὸς βραχὺ ἀκοῦσαι τῆς ἐμῆς φωνῆς ἠνέσχοντο.

(29.) ὅπως τὰ βῆλα τὰ ἔχοντα τοιαύτην γραφὴν συλλεγέντα εἰς ταφὴν τῶν πτωχῶν προχωρήσειεν, τὰ δὲ ἐν τοίχοις διὰ χρωμάτων λευκανθῆναι.

(30.) τὰ δὲ ἐν μουσαρίῳ προληφθέντα γραφῆναι, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερές ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνασκεύασμα, εἰ μὲν δυνατὸν ἀνασκευασθῆναι, καλόν· εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀρκεσθῆναι τοῖς προγεγονόσι καὶ μηκέτι τινὰ ζωγραφεῖν οὕτως.

* Επιφάνιος Σαλαμίνος / Epiphanius of Salamis,Ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Θεοδόσιον τὸν βασιλέα /
Epistula ad Theodosium imperatorem (fragmenta)
[CPG 5371].
[Ελληνικά/Greek, PDF]

ECHR protects rights of conscientious objectors in Turkey /Το ΕΔΔΑ προστατεύει τα δικαιώματα των αντιρρησιών συνείδησης στην Τουρκία

The absence of an alternative to military service
in Turkey is in breach of the right
to conscientious objection

In today’s Chamber judgment in the case Erçep v. Turkey (application no. 43965/04), which is not final1, the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been:

A violation of Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the European Convention on Human Rights and,

A violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention.

The case concerned the refusal by the applicant, a Jehovah’s Witness and conscientious objector, to perform military service for reasons of conscience.


Principal facts

The applicant, Yunus Erçep, is a Turkish national who was born in 1969 and lives in Istanbul (Turkey). He is a Jehovah’s Witness who was baptised at the age of 13, and refuses to perform his military service as required by section 1 of the 1927 Act, according to which “all adult males of Turkish nationality shall be liable to conscription for military service”.

The applicant was declared fit to perform military service on 6 January 1997 and was called up for the first time in March 1998. Under the relevant legislation people who failed to report for duty when called for military service were regarded as deserters.

Each time a new call-up period began, criminal proceedings for failure to report for duty were brought against the applicant in the Trabzon Military Criminal Court. He was sentenced to several terms of imprisonment for failing to report for duty following approximately 15 call-ups.

In a judgment of 7 May 2004 the military court decided to impose an aggregate sentence totalling seven months and 15 days’ imprisonment. On 3 October 2005 Mr Erçep began serving his sentence. Five months later he was released on licence.

On 6 October 2006 Parliament passed a new law under which military courts no longer had jurisdiction to try civilians. The criminal proceedings still pending were transferred to the ordinary courts. Since then Mr Erçep has been tried before the criminal courts on the same charge. Since March 1998, more than 25 sets of proceedings have been brought
against him. As a result of his persistent refusal to perform military service he faces further criminal proceedings with each new call-up.

Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court

The applicant complained that his successive convictions for refusing to serve in the armed forces amounted to a violation of Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion).

Relying on Article 6 (right to a fair trial), he complained of having been obliged, as a civilian, to appear before a court made up exclusively of military officers.

The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 6 October 2004.

Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven, composed as follows:

Françoise Tulkens (Belgium), President,
Danutė Jočienė (Lithuania),
Dragoljub Popović (Serbia),
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre (Monaco),
András Sajó (Hungary),
Işıl Karakaş (Turkey),
Guido Raimondi (Italy), Judges,
and also Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar.


Decision of the Court

Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion)

The Court had recently reviewed its case-law concerning conscientious objectors, in its Grand Chamber judgment in Bayatyan v. Armenia. In that judgment it had noted that Article 9 did not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious objection. However, it considered that opposition to military service, where it was motivated by a serious and insurmountable conflict between the obligation to serve in the army and a person’s conscience, constituted a conviction or belief of sufficient importance to attract the guarantees of Article 9. In the today's case the Court observed that Mr Erçep was a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, a religious group that had consistently opposed military service. There was no reason to doubt that his objection was motivated by anything other than genuinely-held religious beliefs.

In Turkey, all citizens declared fit for national service were required to report for duty when called up and to perform military service. No alternative civilian service existed. Conscientious objectors had no option but to refuse to enrol in the army if they wished to remain true to their convictions. In so doing, they laid themselves open to a sort of “civil death” because of the numerous sets of criminal proceedings which the authorities invariably brought against them; they could face prosecution for the rest of their lives. The Court considered that that situation was not compatible with law enforcement in a democratic society.

In virtually all the member States of the Council of Europe (47 European countries) which still had military service, some form of civilian service had been introduced in order to provide alternatives for people opposed to military service for reasons of conscience.

The Court took the view that the numerous convictions imposed on Mr Erçep because of his beliefs, in a situation where no form of civilian service offering a fair alternative existed in Turkey, amounted to a violation of Article 9.

Article 6 (right to a fair trial)

Mr Erçep complained of the fact that, as a civilian, he had had to appear before a court made up exclusively of military officers. The Court observed that, despite being accused of an offence under the Military Criminal Code, the applicant was, for criminal-law purposes, not a member of the armed forces but a civilian. Furthermore, it was clear from a judgment of the Jurisdiction Disputes Court dated 13 October 2008 that, in Turkish criminal law, a person was considered to be a member of the armed forces only from the time he or she reported for duty with a regiment.

The Court considered it understandable that the applicant, a civilian standing trial before a court composed exclusively of military officers, charged with offences relating to military service, should have been apprehensive about appearing before judges belonging to the army, which could be identified with a party to the proceedings. In such circumstances, a civilian could legitimately fear that the military court might allow itself to be unduly influenced by partial considerations.

Acknowledging that the applicant’s doubts about the independence and impartiality of that court could be regarded as objectively justified, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in that regard.

Article 41

Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court held that Turkey was to pay the applicant 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 5,000 in respect of costs and expenses.

* ECHR 254 (2011) 22.11.2011,
"The absence of an alternative to military service in Turkey is in breach of the right to conscientious objection"
["Η απουσία εναλλακτικής της στρατιωτικής υπηρεσίας στην Τουρκία αποτελεί παραβίαση του δικαιώματος στην αντίρρηση συνείδησης"].
[English/Αγγλικά, PDF]    *    *


* ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ, 22 Νοεμβρίου 2011,
"Δικαιώθηκε μάρτυρας του Ιεχωβά που αρνήθηκε να υπηρετήσει την στρατιωτική του θητεία στην Τουρκία".

Εβραίοι: «Ανεπιθύμητοι» και στη Θεσσαλονίκη; / Jews: "Unwelcome" at Thessaloniki as well?

Επιγραφή σε παράθυρο,
«Οι Εβραίοι (είναι) ανεπιθύμητοι εις το κατάστημα».
Θεσσαλονίκη, Μάιος 1941.

* Source: / Πηγή:
The International School for Holocaust Studies,
"Ένα τραγούδι μετά τη βροχή... Η ιστορία της Εβραϊκής Κοινότητας Θεσσαλονίκης".

Religious convictions, health professionals & "the right to personal liberty and in particular to physical and mental integrity" /Θρησκευτικές πεποιθήσεις, ο κλάδος της υγείας& «το δικαίωμα στην προσωπική ελευθερία και συγκεκριμένα στη σωματική και πνευματική ακεραιότητα»

Pain Medicine,
Volume 12, Issue 11,
pp. 1684–1688 , November 2011
American Academy of Pain Medicine.

Respecting the Will of the Patient:
Between Illusions and Realities

PETR MUZNY PROF. JUDR 

DOI: 10.1111/j.1526-4637.2011.01258.x 

Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Dear Editor,

Respect for the wishes of the informed and capable patient constitutes a fundamental legal and ethical principle, accepted to a large degree in the majority of democracies for going on 30 years now. In Switzerland, the right of individuals to self-determination seems to enjoy an even stronger recognition than in other states, the acceptance of assisted suicide being indicative of this. The right of individuals to self-determination is laid down in Swiss law in Article 10 paragraph 2 of the Swiss Constitution, dated April 18, 1999, as well as in Article 28 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. They respectively provide that “everyone has the right to personal liberty and in particular to physical and mental integrity and to freedom of movement” and “an infringement is unlawful if it is not justified by the consent of the victim, by an overriding public or private interest, or by law.”

In other words, no infringement of the physical integrity of an individual is possible without his consent.

It is true that the law lays down exceptions under which it is possible to infringe the liberty of the individual, i.e., when an “overriding private or public interest” occurs. Such could be the mandatory vaccination of individuals against a contagious virus that poses a threat for the entire population. However, the possibility of limiting a patient's rights does not exist when the patient's choice only affects himself. Take the example of someone who refuses chemotherapy at an advanced stage of his illness; the effects of his choice are limited to himself, his family, and his relatives.

This respect for the individual's autonomy has been clearly expressed by the Federal Court, which serves, in a way, as the official and supreme interpreter of Swiss legislation. It ruled that “The right of a patient to self-determination is extremely broad, and encompasses for the one concerned the refusal of any curative practices, even if this leads to death. In effect, personal liberty grants the patient the right to live through his illness in the way he sees fitting.”[1]

Thus, in this matter, the rules are unequivocal. Nonetheless, the opinions, declarations and even the practices on the part of health professionals regularly challenge this legal and ethical reality in such a way that gives the impression that the right to self-determination is only an illusion, a mirage, unattainable for those depending on it. This is by all means what was revealed in a study carried out relatively recently and published in the journal Pain Medicine[2], regarding a number of ethical positions expressed by caregivers at the University Hospitals of Geneva (I).

We would like to offer the reader a reality check, especially in the light of a critical commentary written by an American ethicist in answer to that study, and published in the same journal [3] (II).

I. Time of Illusions

The report of the research of Cahana et al. is based on a statistical study carried out by doctors and ethicists from the University of Geneva with caregivers from the University Hospitals of Geneva.

This study was made in the course of a bioethics seminar in which 29 anesthesiologists, 41 surgeons, 21 surgical nurses, and 33 nurse anesthetists participated. The same question asked before and after the seminar was a classic case involving a patient's right to self-determination:

A 40-year-old woman, one of Jehovah's Witnesses who has to undergo an elective excision of a large hemangioma on her right forearm, to be followed by a latissimus dorsi muscle flap transplant, clearly refuses any blood transfusion. Would you give blood to the patient in the case of life-threatening danger?

The results are shown in Table 1.

Table 1.  Study results
Choice	Participants (N)
	Anesthesiologists (29)†	Nurse Anesthetists (33)	Surgeons (41)	Surgical Nurses (21)
Transfusion, % (n)	55 (16)	36 (12)	29 (12)	29 (6)
Abstaining from transfusion, % (n)	38 (11)	64 (21)	68 (28)	71 (15)
Undecided, % (n)	7 (2)	0%	3 (1)	0

^† The figures of the study for this column containing the anesthesiologists are somewhat different because they do not take into consideration the two who abstained from responding. Therefore, the results given by the authors of the study are as follows: 59% would give a blood transfusion and 41% would not transfuse. Nonetheless, we have preferred to take into account the two indecisive ones to make sure that the figures given reflect the reality more precisely.

What Do These Figures Show?

Even though a majority of caregivers would refuse to administer a blood transfusion (61% against 38%), there is one particular category of caregivers that would not hesitate to override the will of their patients: the anesthesiologists. A clear majority among them is willing to force a blood transfusion upon the patient even after they have attended a seminar dealing with ethics, as the figures earlier show.

Such an approach seems to be surprising, given the unequivocal legal regulation concerning this matter, the ethical principles favoring the autonomy of the informed and capable patient, and the fact that this group of caregivers is aware of the patient's wishes. All the more surprising, given that the decision to administer a blood transfusion ultimately rests in the hands of these anesthesiologists. Briefly then, this study reveals the attitude of anesthesiologists and shows what would happen to the patient in such a case as described earlier, especially if the patient was unconscious.

However, looking beyond the figures and percentages given, far more surprising are two other aspects revealed by the study: first, the matter of the rationales chosen by the anesthesiologists in order to justify their choice to override the will of the patient, and second, the relatively accommodating way in which the authors of the study interpreted the figures, authors who themselves are specialists when it comes to questions of medical ethics. What are these two arguments?

According to the authors of the study, two rationales are brought to the fore by those in the group who would refuse to heed the patient's choice.

First, the overriders (OVRs)¹ of the patient's will would administer a blood transfusion to the patient because they doubted whether he “really understood what it means to die,” and second, because the OVRs refer to their own feelings of compassion in making themselves defenders of the patient's well-being.

Concerning the first argument, they explained their choice as being the need to take into account the consequences for the patient, especially of the risk of death. They stated that the evaluation of the degree of the patient's autonomy must be undertaken in the light of the specific context of a treatment that could carry fatal risks for the individual.² In other words, it is implied that the level of requirement must be particularly strict in this type of case, more so than in other situations where vital prognosis is not undertaken.

Regarding the second argument, the researchers say it is not enough to be technically competent to be a good doctor; at the same time, he must show compassion toward the patient.

That means taking into account the patient's existential needs that therefore prevent him from “obeying” the patient's choice, and all the more so as it is the anesthesiologists, from among all the medical team members, who have to render an account to the institution regarding the negative consequences, which could be brought about by the patient's choice.³

What Can Be Made of Such Comments?

Even though these comments seem to represent good reasoning per se, under strict scrutiny, it appears that they are purely theoretical, in discrepancy with reality.

So, let us get back to reality.

II. The Return to Reality

We shall take up these two rationales or arguments one after the other. We will also include the expressions of Dr. John D. Banja from his critical commentary, written as a response to this study.

The Argument Concerning the Lack of Capacity to Discern the Negative Consequences of the Choice of Treatment

It goes without saying that the choice of treatment in a vital issue is of a far greater magnitude than, for example, making choices regarding what type of automobile or clothes to buy. Therefore, it is to be assumed, when life is at stake, that the evaluation of a patient's capacity to choose a treatment must be realized in an especially careful and attentive way. But this does not at all mean that a patient who chooses a potentially dangerous health treatment must automatically be considered as being someone incapable of discernment. However, this is exactly what the OVRs, as well as the authors of the study, seem to insinuate—even more so as the study does not detail the psychological characteristics of the patient in question—and the OVRs responded without even asking about the reality of the patient's capacity to consent to treatment.

Here are some questions that the medical personnel should have asked themselves before they responded to the questions in the survey:

·         Knowing that the law presumes the existence of the capacity of adult patients, are there solid reasons that allow me to doubt such, simply because of the fact that a patient chooses a treatment that is contraindicated and liable to be fatal to him?

·         Because it is all about the patient's ability to take a reasoned decision, did he have at his command enough information in order to make his choice? Is he fully aware of the attendant circumstances of the situation and particularly of the medical diagnostics, of the recommended therapeutic intervention, of the induced risks as a result of his choice, and the phase through which he risks crossing the borderline between life and death?

·         What is it that leads the patient, despite everything, to opt for a contraindicated treatment?

·         Finally, has he come under external pressure, which could suppress his discernment?

As far as we know, the seminar did not deal with such questions and even less with the answers to such questions. This could have been a “trap,” which perfectly served the interests of the organizers of the seminar, thus precisely allowing the participants to omit this fundamental methodological aspect from now on when it comes to evaluating situations—and all of this under the mantle of education. However, it seems that such was not the case, because the organizers of the seminar made no reference to such aspects in their written record. Besides, following the title of their study, it can be seen that the authors found the most interesting point to be the difference in behavior of the different groups of caregivers, rather than the reasons for their behavior. The methodological approach to ethics was not highlighted.

The seminar would have been more realistic and effective if it had helped the participants to ask themselves questions concerning patients' capacity for discernment when it comes to such types of issues. This would have allowed these caregivers to acquire a consistent methodological approach rather than coming forward retrospectively with a contradicting argument in order to justify their behavior.

In the critical article in response to this study, Dr. John D. Banja shares the idea that the patient was endowed with capacity to choose his treatment. Thus, he confronts the OVRs with a fundamental fact. According to him, believing that a patient who is a Jehovah's Witness, otherwise intelligent and discerning, is not capable of understanding the concept of death, is devoid of common sense.

In reality, based on existing research in the field of psychology, children at the age of 9 years already start to form an idea about death. In addition, believing that a mature and intelligent person does not know what it means to die is tantamount to saying that he has never seen, read, or understood information about death, and that he has never asked questions about the philosophical or religious concepts of this subject. Indeed, if an otherwise thoughtful and mature patient who is a Jehovah's Witness does not understand the meaning of death, why should we think any other patient does who refuses life-saving treatment, e.g., dialysis, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, artificial ventilation, etc.? But that would mean agreeing to go back in time several decades, to the time of primitive paternalism, which, it is easy to imagine, is neither wished for by medical professionals nor by patients.

Further, the author concludes that where the medical professional doubts whether the patient who is a Jehovah's Witness knows what death means, then you only need to do a very simple thing: just ask him. With these remarks, Dr. Banda pinpoints a fundamental element of the doctor-patient relationship that everyone knows about, but which tends to be put aside at particularly critical moments in favor of supposed medical efficiency: communication full of empathy, and it is especially at risk when it is most needed.

The Argument Concerning the Compassionate Approach of the Physician Who Favors the Patient's Need to Survive

The authors of the study are completely right in stating that the competence of a medical professional cannot only be measured by his technical skills, but also by his personal qualities. Indeed, there are times in the medical field, as in other scientific fields, when the personality of the medical professional as well as his capacity to feel the frailty of the patient in his own heart, are necessary to preserve mutual trust, which is absolutely essential in the doctor–patient relationship.

This empathy, however, should not be interpreted as a way to discard the patient's wishes. To the contrary, empathy, with its capacity to put oneself into another person's shoes, as it were, aims at conscientiously taking into consideration the ethical stance of the patient. It is not a matter of projecting one's own values onto the patient, but rather, to understand those values that inspire this particular patient. As Dr. Roggo confirms: “This is often disagreeable and creates extra work. This additional work, however, also could be the consequence of insufficient work, in extreme cases it could even be an expression of human and professional incompetency”[4]. Understanding is not the same as agreeing or joining. Indeed, it would be very difficult for a caregiver who is, for example, an atheist, to understand that a patient who is a Jehovah's Witness, is convinced that God would resurrect him to everlasting life if he respects the biblical command to abstain from blood and thus refuses a treatment, which this medical professional considers life-saving (“Witnesses believe that blood transfusion is prohibited by Biblical passages such as Acts 15:19–21, which say ‘Abstain  . . . from fornication and from what is strangled [unbled meat] and from blood.’ This first century apostolic decree, which was repeated at Acts 21:25, took into consideration the divine command given to Noah, the common ancestor of humankind, according to the Biblical record, and its reappearance in the Mosaic Law over 850 years later (Genesis 9:3, 4; Leviticus 7:26, 27; 17:1, 2, 10–12; Deuteronomy 12:22–25)”) [5].

For example, he could ask himself the following series of questions:

·         Can I impose my personal view of things on the capable patient simply because I am the medical professional and because these values are commonly shared by a large number of individuals in society?

·         Is it so that I am certain to be right from both the medical as well as from the moral point of view?

·         Could it be that I consider the patient to be like a corpse denuded of spirit which I have to save at all costs? Are there not other people—firefighters, mountain rescuers, soldiers, etc.—who are willing to sacrifice their lives for values they consider nobler, without my considering them as lacking discernment? [6]

·         Finally, would I wish to live in a society in which, in the name of a universal truth, which stipulates which are the best choices for life, people would be forced to abstain from alcohol, to abstain from eating fondue, to exercise five times a week, and to be under an obligation to strive to live as long as possible?

Here are so many delicate questions that could help the medical professional to see more clearly the reality of the motives that inspire him and to help him to apply true empathy in the relationship, which binds him to the patient whose requests surpass the ordinary.

In his study, Dr. Banja develops other arguments. He shows that the medical professional may feel compassion for the patient in question because he himself may suffer upon seeing the patient subjected to the merciless consequences of his beliefs. But he forgets at the same time that these feelings of compassion are based on the values held by the individual and that these are not necessarily shared by others.

According to him, true protection of the patient's rights requires that the medical professional undertakes the effort to respect the way of thinking of the patient who is a Jehovah's Witness, even though he feels pained to realize that the patient prefers to give priority to gaining everlasting life, rather than to a temporary prolongation of his present life. The fact that the OVRs would reject this hierarchy of values by negating the patient's will gives way to a paternalistic attitude, which is exactly the opposite of a compassionate one.

Finally, the author has serious questions even regarding the very foundations of the choice made by the OVRs. On the basis of research done by psychologists in the 1950s on the theory of dissonance, he explains that all human reasoning pursues a specific goal. And when such reasoning corresponds with his own behavior, the individual often has the tendency to justify his own choices in order to find excuses or to ensure that the information or the events that are in disagreement with his own hierarchy of values, fit in, one way or another. This is because of the fact that the majority of us ponder over things while having a high opinion of ourselves, of our own capacity, values and choices—and one has to admit—members of the medical professional are no exception. To the contrary, their highly respected professional status, the constant dependency of the patients on their professional capacity, and therefore their obvious natural superiority over the patient pushes them to develop a firm personality imbued with strong self-confidence.

It is therefore fully understandable that when a “troublemaker” such as a patient who is a Jehovah's Witness does not agree with the logic of the medical professional, the latter would have to put forward a great effort in order to comprehend his alter ego, because he has to let go of his own autonomous reflections for a heteronomous approach. This is especially the case when the life of the patient is at stake and the logical thought of the medical professional would be to use commonly accepted medical techniques in order to rescue the patient and to save his life. One can understand here how the personal qualities of the caregiver are essential in view of such a task. Will the medical professional be capable of taking a little bit of time out of his already busy workday in order to try to understand the particularities of his patient? Will he be able to prove his humility by putting aside his own prejudices? The task is not easy. Nonetheless, it is here where his work challenges him, because—let us not forget—he has agreed to serve the patient [7]. It is here where finally true medical ethics begin, based upon genuine respect for the patient and which truly establishes a treatment worthy to be called a therapy. For what merit has the caregiver as regards tolerance when he only respects and cares for patients who quietly submit themselves willingly to his point of view?

Let us be reassured, however, that the task is not insurmountable.

As far as patients who are Jehovah's Witnesses are concerned, especially in the United States, quality ethical workshops are organized on a regular basis in collaboration with the Hospital Liaison Committees of Jehovah's Witnesses [8] with the aim of best managing such delicate situations. They help the participants particularly to determine the patient's unambiguous capacity for discernment and whether external pressures possibly exist. By the way, hospital management plays a fundamental role when it comes to encouraging its staff to have such an open approach, knowing that it helps the staff to give such patients better treatment. Finally, medical professionals also have sufficient legal information in order to know that they could be prosecuted, should they brush aside the will of the capable patient in order to enforce their own wishes [9] (see also Trechsel and Noll [10]).

In conclusion, even though the results of the study of Cahana et al. as well as the commentaries of these authors are somewhat surprising and disappointing, they still have the merit of pin-pointing current incoherencies and weaknesses regarding ethical and legal practices that can take place even in a well-reputable hospital. Realizing this makes it possible to react, because the worst thing is not that such situations occur but rather, that they persist without anything being done to remedy it.

Therefore, it would be fitting if hospital authorities would seize the opportunity to help their entire body of medical personal to acquire a real ethical approach based on empathy toward the patient whatever the circumstances. From this we all would benefit.

Summary

Under Swiss legislation, the right of the informed and capable patient to self-determination is absolute. Nevertheless, a statistical survey undertaken at the University Hospitals of Geneva reveals that the reality is markedly different in the mindset of a number of caregivers, particularly among anesthesiologists and especially when they consider that the patient's choice could be fatal. It is the object of our article to examine carefully the two main arguments put forward in this survey by the caregivers, for overriding the patient's will. We shall conduct our considerations in the light of a second, critical article, which appeared sometime later, in the same journal, in answer to the first statistical study published.

Notes

·         1 Banja (2009, 878).

·         2 Cahana A, et al. (2008, 734).

·         3 Ibid.

References

·         Swiss Federal Court. Swiss Federal Court Decision, 28 April 2003, Application number 4P 265/2002, §5.5. In French and German. Available at: http://www.bger.ch (accessed October 9, 2011).

·         Cahana A, Weibel H, Hurst SA. Ethical decision-making: Do anesthesiologists, surgeons, nurse anaesthetists, and surgical nurses reason similarly? Pain Med 2008;6:728–36.

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·         Banja JD. Overriding the Jehovah's Witness patient's refusal of blood: A reply to Cahana, Weibel, and Hurst. Pain Med 2009;5:878–82.

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